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INTRODUCTION

The Trump Administration's (arguably) most polemic immigration
policy-Executive Order No. 13,767 mandating the construction of an
international border wall along the southwest border of the United
States'-offers a timely and instructive opportunity to revisit the elusive
question of the federal eminent domain power and the historical practice
of cooperative federalism. From federal efforts to restrict admission and
entry of foreign nationals and aliens (the so-called "travel ban") 2 to
conditioning federal grants on sanctuary city compliance with federal
*

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
2. See generally Hawaii v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646, 649-50 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam);
Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 573, 6
34 (4th Cir. 2017); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam); Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 719, 724 (E.D. Va. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 241
F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1122, 1127, 1138 (D. Haw. 2017); Aziz v. Trump, 234 F. Supp. 3d 724,
726-28 (E.D. Va. 2017).
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3
immigration enforcement, state and local governments (mostly liberal
4
and Democratic enclaves) today have become combative by resisting a
federal immigration agenda pushed by the Trump Administration. These
efforts to resist rely upon self-determined local and state policymaking or
5
the federal courts to sustain sovereign autonomy. However, amidst the
more well-known examples of "uncooperative federalism," such as the
travel ban and sanctuary cities, is a property law angle to "cooperative
federalism." A recently introduced bill in Congress may be viewed not
only as a political reaction to an arguably heavy-handed federal
immigration policy, but an aide-m6moire to an old cooperative system of
land acquisitions between the federal government and the states in the

early republic.
In October 2017, ten Democratic members of the House of
Representatives introduced "Protecting the Property Rights of Border
Landowners Act" that, if passed, would prohibit Attorney General Jeff
Sessions and Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary of the Department of Homeland
6
Security ("DHS"), from acquiring, by eminent domain, private property
7
along the border to build an international border wall. Specifically, the
bill restricts the federal eminent domain power for purposes of
"constructing a wall, or other physical barrier, along the international
8
border between the United States and Mexico."
The bill is just one of many congressional responses to President
Donald J. Trump's immigration policy. The proposed amendment revises
9
the existing Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), which currently
gives the Secretary of DHS the authority to put resources into her agency
to patrol the border, and where necessary and appropriate, construct
3. See generally County of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 17-cv-00574-WHO, 17-cv-00485WHO, 2017 WL 5569835, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017); City of Philadelphia v. Sessions,
No. 17-3894, 2017 WL 5489476, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2017); City of Seattle v. Trump,
No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 WL 4700144, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017); City of Chicago v.
Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933, 936-38 (N.D. Ill. 2017); City of Richmond v. Trump, No. 17cv-01535-WHO, 2017 WL 3605216, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2017); County of Santa Clara
v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 507 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
4. See Federalism and Administrative Structure, 92 YALE L.J. 1342, 1343 (1983)
(published summary of a paper presented by Robert Cover at a Yale symposium) (arguing
that "'cooperative federalism' undermines the only viable restraint on the congressional
exercise of enumerated powers: the political process").
5. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 14-16, California v. United
States, No. 17CV1911W BLM (S.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2017), 2017 WL 4216386 (contending that
section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, known as
the REAL ID waiver authority, is unconstitutional).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. H.R. 3943, 115th Cong. (2017).

8.
9.

Id.
Id.
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barriers. 10 The sponsors of the bill to restrict the federal eminent domain
power are all Democrats representing districts either abutting or located
near the U.S. border with Mexico (with the exception of New York),
including ones in Texas, New Mexico, California, and Arizona."
The proposed amendment is instructive. It reminds us that, indeed,
the early practice at the founding of the nation was to limit, or simply
refuse to recognize, the federal government's power to condemn land
within state borders. 12 For almost eight decades after ratification the
federal government did not purely exercise an eminent domain power. 13
Instead, the custom was for the federal government to identify land
located within state borders that it needed for a federal project (say, for
a courthouse, lighthouse, or roads) and request a state legislature to
condemn the land and convey it over to the federal government. 14 Or the
federal government would file suit in state court as a plaintiff and follow
state condemnation proceedings to acquire the land. 15 Otherwise, during
that era, the Takings Clause was arguably a constraint on the federal
government's power to condemn land only in the District of Columbia and
the federal territories where it always had the sovereign power similarly
available to the states.16 This historical record suggests the federal power
to condemn land was not an essential ingredient for the federal
government to accomplish its major federal projects, particularly military
and national security building.17 Instead, it was cooperation with the
states.
This Essay sheds light on the old cooperative system of land
acquisition between the federal government and the states in light of
today's debates over land acquisition for the construction of an
international wall. This Essay proceeds in three Parts.
Part I briefly discusses President Trump's Executive Order
mandating the construction of a physical wall along the border for
purposes of national security and raises some of the potential land
acquisition obstacles the Trump Administration faces along the way.
Part II explores the historical practices and sentiments of federal
land acquisition post-ratification. In particular, this Part explores the

10. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012).
11. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1556-60
(2012).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE. L.J.
1738, 1738 (2013).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1762.
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debates in Congress and amongst federal and state courts, including the
Supreme Court, over the question of whether Congress enjoyed a federal
eminent domain power. William Baude's scholarship is instructive on
this point.18 Part II also shows how the consent and cooperation system
of land acquisition between the federal government and the states
actually operated in practice, drawing on mid to late 1800s examples of
cooperation to acquire land for forts and arsenals. This history suggests
that the founding generation would likely have been reluctant to allow
Congress to seize private land purely within state boundaries for an
international wall, or any other national security or civil-military project.
Part III draws practical parallels and political contradictions
between the history of cooperative federalism and the recent bill
introduced by House Democrats to restrict the federal takings power
along the border. This contemporary effort to rein in the federal eminent
domain power, supported entirely by Democrats, embraces an originalist
spirit of the founding generation by potentially forcing a Republican
Administration and Republican-led Congress to revert to a system of
consent and cooperation to acquire land for the border wall. 19
If such a bill were to pass, the federal government, in essence, would
likely have to pursue alternative means, such as filing as a plaintiff in
state court to condemn land necessary for the wall, or requesting the
legislatures of states bordering Mexico to condemn the land under state
20
Of course, the
law and then purchase the land from the states.
political
current
the
likelihood of the bill's passage is quite low given
hinder
not
climate in Washington. However, this political reality should
of
support
the unusually paradoxical nature of today's Republicans'
efforts
Democrats'
federal takings to acquire land for the border wall and
to restrain the national eminent domain power.
18. Id. at 1738.
19. It is fair to say that both Republicans and Democrats (and for that matter
conservatives and liberals) have historically entertained a game of fair-weather federalism,
choosing expanded federal intervention or state and local control depending on the political
environment at the time. Heather Gerken has written on this subject of progressive
federalism tending to flip (or readjust) the paradigm of the historical binary vision of
conservative support for federalism and liberal support for national power. See Heather K.
Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY, no. 24, Spring 2012, at 37, https://
For example, many
democracyjournal.org/magazine/24/a-new-progressive-federalism.
Democrats supported stronger policing and patrolling of the southwest border, including
condemning private lands to construct a 700-mile fence along the border in 2007, during
the Bush Administration. See infra Part I; Annie Linskey, In 2006, Democrats Were Saying
'Build That Fence!' Bos. GLOBE (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics
/2017/01/26/when-wall-was-fence-and-democrats-embraced/QE7ieCBXjXVxO63pLMTe90/
story.html.
20. See infra Part III (discussing examples of the old cooperative federalism system of
land acquisition in detail).
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I. THE BORDER WALL EXECUTIVE ORDER

On January 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued an
Executive Order mandating the "immediate construction of a physical
wall on the southern border" of the United States. 21 Pursuant to the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 22 the Secure Fence Act of 2006,23 and
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 ("IIRIRA"),24 the Executive Order seeks to "ensure that the Nation's
immigration laws are faithfully executed" 25 and to protect the country
from a "recent surge of illegal immigration at the southern border with
Mexico." 26 The Executive Order proposes, among other things, the
construction of a physical, contiguous, and impassable wall along the
southern border at all points of entry in accordance with the Secure Fence
Act and the IIRIRA to mitigate illegal immigration.27 Under current
federal laws, Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, may take
necessary steps to allocate resources to construct the wall, and with the
assistance of Attorney General Jeff Sessions and the Department of
Justice, acquire the necessary land to construct the wall by voluntary
sale or eminent domain. 28 The response to the Executive Order was both
welcoming and divisive. 29 And while an international wall requires
congressional approval of federal funds to finance such a large-scale
national security project, some of the most difficult problems are not
necessarily the costs, but land acquisition. 30
Indeed, the construction of an international border wall would be
inconceivable if it were not for Congress's power to acquire private

21. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
22. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2012).
23. Pub. L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006).
24. Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-546 to -724 (1996).
25. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8793.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 8794. A physical wall is defined in the Executive Order as a "contiguous,
physical wall or other similarly secure, contiguous, and impassable physical barrier." Id.
28. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)-(b) (2012).
29. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Orders Mexican Border Wall to Be Built and Plans
to Block Syrian Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/
us/politics/refugees-immigrants-wall-trump.html;
David Nakamura,
Trump Signs
Directive to Start Border Wall with Mexico, Ramp Up Immigration Enforcement, WASH.
POST (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-pledges-to-startwork-on-border-wall-within-months/2017/01/25/dddae6ee-e31e-1 1e6-bal 1-63c4b4fb5a
63-story.html?utmterm=.8858e7feaeal.
30. Gerald S. Dickinson, The Biggest Problem for Trump's Border Wall Isn't Money. It's
Getting the Land, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
posteverything/wp/ 2 017/03/03/the-biggest-problem-with-trumps-border-wall-isnt-moneyits-getting-the-land/?utm term=.a5c78fc44155.
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31
property by eminent domain. The U.S.-Mexico border is almost two
32
Only about one-third-approximately 632 miles-of
thousand miles.
the land the wall would sit on is owned by the federal government or by
33
States or private property owners, especially
Native American tribes.
along the Texas-Mexico border, own approximately sixty percent of the
borderland. 34 Texas, where more than half of the land abutting Mexico is
located, retained its public lands when it was admitted to the Union in
1845.35 The state retained title to its land and therefore was not
implicated by President Theodore Roosevelt's "Roosevelt Reservation,"
which designated lands within sixty feet of the U.S.-Mexico border as
36
public in 1907, including parts of California, New Mexico, and Arizona.
Most of the land Texas retained has now been sold to private property
owners and local governments. Today, approximately forty-nine hundred
privately owned parcels exist along the Texas-Mexico border, which
means there will likely be many takings challenges to come if landowners
37
refuse voluntary sale and purchase negotiations. The construction of a
seven hundred mile fence along the border during the Bush and Obama
Administrations required a significant number of condemnations to be
filed in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California between 2007 and
38
2012, some of which are still ongoing.

31. General Condemnation Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3113 (2012). While the General
Condemnation Act ("GCA") gives the federal government the general power to exercise
eminent domain, the Declaration of Taking Act ("DTA") created a procedure to expedite the
taking of title and possession of lands to enable the United States to begin construction
work before final judgment. 40 U.S.C. § 3114 (2012). This expedited procedure has raised
concerns amongst affected landowners as to whether the federal government will
adequately negotiate or properly consult with landowners prior to, during, or after
condemnation proceedings. Congress mandates some level of negotiation between the
federal government and the affected landowner of a property interest prior to the institution
of eminent domain procedures. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(3) (2012). The negotiation must be a bona
fide effort. See United States v. Certain Interests in Prop. in Cascade, 163 F. Supp. 518,
524 (D. Mont. 1958). Further, a federal court may require additional negotiations as a
condition precedent to condemnation if it finds negotiations inadequate. See United States
v. 1.04 Acres of Land, 538 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1011 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (citing Cascade, 163 F.
Supp. at 524).
32. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-399, SOUTHWEST BORDER: ISSUES
RELATED TO PRIVATE PROPERTY DAMAGE 5 (2015).

33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
United States v. City & Cty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 5 n.2 (Colo. 1982) (en banc).

CHAD C. HADDAL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33659, BORDER SECURITY:
36.
BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL BORDER 17-18 (2009).

37. Anne Ryman, Dennis Wagner, Rob O'Dell & Kirsten Crow, Journey Reveals Reality
of the Border-And Roadblocks to a Wall, USA TODAY: THE WALL, https://
www.usatoday.com/border-wall (last visited Apr. 23, 2018).
38. United States v. 1.04 Acres of Land, 538 F. Supp. 2d 995 (S.D. Tex. 2008). In 1996,
Congress passed the IIRIRA, which gave the Attorney General the authority to condemn
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Today, it is d6jA vu all over again, but this time the rhetorical punch
of a "fence" along the border has been replaced with an impassable and
contiguous "wall." While Congress and the Trump Administration's
power to appropriate federal monies to construct the international wall
is universally accepted today, historically Congress and its federal agents
did not enjoy such a pure and direct power to condemn private property
within state boundaries. This history makes the recently introduced bill
by Democrats (which I will discuss shortly) to rein in the federal eminent
domain power a timely opportunity to discuss an old cooperative relic of
the past.
II. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND TAKINGS AT THE FOUNDING

It is commonly accepted that both federal and state governments may
take private property for a public use upon just compensation. 39 The
power to condemn has been a key ingredient for many of the
government's modern-day national security and public works projects.
Part of the universal acceptance is that Congress statutorily authorizes
the power, and any officer of the government may use the power to
acquire real estate that is necessary or advantageous by filing a taking
action in federal court. 40 William Baude's excellent scholarship helps us
untangle some of the confusion over why this important power exists,
even though nothing in the Constitution expressly grants Congress the
power.4 1 As Baude argues, "[t]he lack of federal eminent domain

land along the border to build fencing. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b)(3) (2012). In 2006, Congress
amended the IIRIRA under the Secure Fence Act of 2006 which allowed the Attorney
General and DHS to construct fencing along the entire U.S.-Mexico border, including parts
of Texas. Pub. L. No. 109-367, § 3, 120 Stat. 2638, 2638-39 (2006). Today, the Attorney
General and the Secretary of DHS enjoy wide-ranging discretion to exercise the federal
takings power. The primary statute effectuating this power is the GCA, which was enacted
in 1888. 40 U.S.C. § 3113 (2012). This statute, along with the Declaration of Takings
statute, was used to take land to construct the 700-mile fence in 2007. See Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 564, 121 Stat. 1844, 2090-91 (2007).
39. See generally Ilya Somin, Is There a Federal Eminent Domain Power?,
JOTWELL.COM (Sept. 4, 2013), https://conlaw.jotwell.comlis-there-a-federal-eminentdomain-power (reviewing Baude, supra note 13).
40. 40 U.S.C. § 3113 (2012) ("An officer of the Federal Government authorized to
acquire real estate for the erection of a public building or for other public uses may acquire
the real estate for the Government by condemnation, under judicial process, when the
officer believes that it is necessary or advantageous to the Government to do so."); William
Michael Treanor, The Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 787 (1995) (noting that a common purpose for exercising
eminent domain in the colonial era was for building roads); see also Baude, supra note 13,
at 1763.
41. See Baude, supra note 13, at 1761.
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authority was not simply the oversight of an earlier time, but rather the
result of a well-functioning regime of cooperative federalism."

42

According to Baude, it took almost eight decades after the founding
for political and doctrinal uncertainty over the federal eminent domain
power to be resolved as a result of a congressional act in 1864 and a
Supreme Court ruling in 1875.43 This history strongly suggests that the
federal power to condemn was not necessary for the government to
pursue its national projects. It is not out of the realm of possibility that
the founding generation would have supported a cooperative system of
takings with the states instead of purely federal action to acquire land
44
for a border wall.

A.

PoliticalDevelopments

There was much confusion over whether Congress could exercise the
power to condemn land within the states post-ratification (starting in
1789 and the amendments beginning in 1791).45 While Congress
historically enjoyed the power to raise money to construct forts,
lighthouses, arsenals, courthouses, and roads, among other things,
Baude's research shows that it is by no means obvious that the Founders
intended to give Congress the power to directly condemn land within the
states to build federal structures, such as walls or fortresses, for national
security purposes. This is further complicated by the text of the founding
document itself, which does not expressly grant such a power. Similar to
today's contentious debates over acquiring land for an international wall,
the acquisition of private property for major national security projects
also endured controversy in the founding era.
James Madison drafted the early versions of the Takings Clause,
which, by the time of ratification, stated: "[N]or shall private property be
6
taken for public use without just compensation."4 But Madison left a thin
42. Id. at 1762.
43. Id. at 1761.
44. Note that many of the states bordering Mexico did not enter the Union until years
after ratification.
45. Baude notes that his question of the origins of the federal eminent domain power
has garnered considerable debate amongst only a few scholars. See Baude, supra note 13,
at 1741; see also Adam S. Grace, From the Lighthouses: How the First Federal Internal
Improvement Projects CreatedPrecedent that Broadened the Commerce Clause, Shrunk the
Takings Clause, and Affected Early Nineteenth Century Constitutional Debate, 68 ALB. L.
REV. 97, 141 (2004); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of Federal
Power: A JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 270 n.8
(1993); Gary Lawson & David B. Kopel, Bad News for ProfessorKoppelman: The Incidental
Unconstitutionalityof the Individual Mandate, 121 YALE L.J. 267, 280-81 (2011).
46. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 77-78
(1998) (alteration in original).
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paper (and oral) trail of what exactly he was thinking when drafting that
ever so important text into the Constitution. As Akhil Amar has noted,
"unlike every other clause in the First Congress's proposed Bill [of
Rights], the just-compensation restriction was not put forth in any form
by any of the state ratifying conventions." 47 There was, in other words,
no discussion about the Takings Clause. 48 The provision was inserted by
Madison just before ratification. 49 Most scholars agree that the provision
was probably meant to protect property from physical seizures 50 by
restraining arbitrary and oppressive means of obtaining supplies for
armies and taking property for other public uses as a result of the
Revolutionary War.5 1 Indeed, some have argued that the power is an
inherent power of the sovereign that can be interpreted within the
Necessary and Proper Clause as well as the Takings Clause. But Amar
has noted that "readers should not infer from the language of the Fifth
Amendment just-compensation clause that Congress enjoyed a general
power of eminent domain. Rather, eminent-domain power, like all other
powers, had to be deduced from the Constitution's earlier enumerations
of governmental authority." 52

While the legislative record of deliberation over those last few words
under the Fifth Amendment is slim, the historical record suggests the
founding generation was skeptical of a national eminent domain power.
Representative James Pindall of Virginia questioned if "any of the
framers of the Constitution could ever have imagined . . . that the power
to . . . lay open the enclosures of individuals for roads . . . without [state]
consent . . . passed into the hands of Congress by implication." 53

Representative Silas Wood of New York stated that "the appropriation of
the soil .

.

. belong[s] exclusively to the States."54 President James

Monroe noted in 1822 that "condemnation of the land, if the proprietors

Id. at 78.
48. See Treanor, supra note 40, at 835-36; see also Baude, supra note 13, at 1794.
49. See Tonja Jacobi et al., Creating a Self- Stabilizing Constitution: The Role of the
Takings Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 601, 617 (2015).
50. Treanor, supra note 40, at 791-92.
51. See id. at 790-92; see also Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 357, 363 (Pa.
1788) (permitting uncompensated takings throughout the Revolutionary War); ST. GEORGE
47.

TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 305-06 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham

Small 1803).
52.

AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 327 (2005).

53.

See Baude, supra note 13, at 1769 (omissions in original) (quoting 32 ANNALS OF

CONG. 1351-52 (1818) (statement of Rep. James Pindall)).

54. Id. at 1769 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 709
(1823) (statement of Rep. Silas Wood)).
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55
should refuse to sell it . . . must be done by the State." Senator Louis
Wigfall of Texas was a vocal critic of the federal power and stated that,
like President Monroe, the Republican Party was not supportive of a
56
federal eminent domain power. But others, such as Speaker of the
House Henry Clay, were supporters of the federal government's power to
57
condemn land to achieve those ends. Some scholars have interpreted
his position to mean that the federal government could exercise its
eminent domain powers for internal improvements, particularly the
58
building of post offices and roads. David Currie, for example, argues
that this position was a recognition of an implicit, inherent power. 5
Political positions on the issue of a federal takings power tended to
(but did not always) break down along party lines. Whigs and
60
Republicans supported a stronger national power. Clay was a Whig at
the time, and the Whigs strongly supported major federal improvements,
61
and thus backed a federal eminent domain power. And Republicans, of
course, were more open to a national power in a variety of areas during
that era. The Democrats and Federalists, however, held the strongest
views for the eminent domain power to remain explicitly in the hands of
the states and not the federal government. They were suspicious and
opposed to such a power, especially as it raised concerns over the federal
government's power to invoke the Takings Clause for purposes of anti62
slavery agendas and ultimately emancipation. As Robert Natelson
notes, "Federalists depicted the Constitution as leaving regulation of real
63
property outside the national authority."

Caleb Cushing, Attorney General in the 1850s, advocated for the
federal power to be dependent upon the states. He raised "equality of
states" arguments to substantiate this position, writing that:

55.

Id. at 1769 (quoting James Monroe, Views of the President of the United States on

the Subject of Internal Improvements (1822), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND

PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 713, 736-37 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897)).
56. Id. at 1778.
57. Id. at 1768 (citing 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 1169 (1818)).
58. Id. at 1769 n.167 (citing Representative Archibald Austin's characterization of
Henry Clay's position on federal eminent domain).
59.

DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-

1829, at 276-77, 312 n.188 (2001).
60. Of course, today the Republican Party generally takes a strongly limited
government position, while the Democratic Party has come to endorse greater national
power. As noted, however, there is increasing fluidity between these general positions. See
supra, note 19.
61. See JEREMIAH SIMEON YOUNG, A POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL STUDY OF THE
CUMBERLAND ROAD 41 (1904); cf. Baude, supra note 13, at 1768-69.

62.
63.

See Baude, supra note 13, at 1793 & nn.323-24.
Robert G. Natelson, The EnumeratedPowers of States, 3 NEV. L.J. 469, 481 (2003).
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[t]he right of eminent domain belongs to [Texas] by title anterior
to, and of course independent of, its accession to the Union....
[E]minent domain of its own territory would pass to it on its
admission into the Union, in virtue of the inherent equality of the
several States. 64
Cushing noted that power to condemn land in Maryland, for example, in
the absence of state consent "might possibly be a matter of controversy."65
Even as late as the 1860s, Congress engaged in "cooperative federalism,"
seeking the consent of the states to condemn land for federal projects.
Indeed, in 1818, "Congress declined a proposal that it explicitly affirm
the existence of the eminent domain power."6 6

The tides started to shift in the early 1860s. Joel Parker, former Chief
Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, used eminent domain as
a case point about the nature of federal powers. He argued that the
Constitution conferred the power of eminent domain on Congress to take
lands for forts, arsenals, navy yards, military roads, and other public
uses.6 7 This sentiment existed even though some proponents of federal

eminent domain powers, like Parker, were generally skeptical of
expansive federal powers. 68 The Maryland Legislature passed a statute
authorizing federal agents to enter into state territory to construct a
national road and, if there was resistance or outright refusal, then
condemnation proceedings could be initiated.69
One pivotal moment in 1864, however, began to seed changes to the
cooperative system of takings practiced by Congress. Congress had just
passed legislation authorizing funding for the building of an arsenal on

64. Christian R. Burset, Response, The Messy History of the Federal Eminent Domain
Power: A Response to William Baude, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 187, 201 n.110 (2013) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Eminent Domain of Tex., 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 334 (1857)); see
also Eminent Domain of the States-Equality of the States, 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 571 (1855)
("The United States never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in
the territory of which any of the new States are formed except for temporary
purposes .... ).
65. Burset, supra note 64, at 202 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wash. Aqueduct, 7 Op.
Att'y Gen. 114 (1855)).
66. Baude, supra note 13, at 1769-71 (citing YOUNG, supra note 61, at 42). However,
Christian Burset argues that the federal power may have already been determined before
ratification and that evidence suggests that, prior to the founding, the interpretations of
the Articles of Confederation show that many implied a federal power of eminent domain.
See Burset, supra note 64, at 190-92.
67. JOEL PARKER, THE RIGHT OF SECESSION 33-34 (1861); see also Burset, supra note
64, at 203-04; Baude, supra note 13, at 1780-81, 1785.
68. See Burset, supra note 64, at 204.
69. YOUNG, supra note 61, at 42-43 (citing 1832 Md. Laws 59, ch. 55).
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Rock Island in Illinois.70 The project was briefly stalled, however, due to
existing land interests on the proposed site. The land standoff resulted
in Vice President Andrew Johnson going before Congress seeking
71
authorization for the Secretary of War to purchase or condemn the land.
Senator John Hale of New Hampshire vehemently opposed such action,
stating that the bill "involves a new principle [federal eminent domain]
in the practice of this Government .

.

.. I think there has been no instance

of an attempt on the part of this Government to take private property in
72
a State for public uses against the consent of the owner." Senator Jacob
Howard of Michigan explained that the bill to fund the construction of an
arsenal on Rock Island-and potentially give direct authority for the
Secretary of War to condemn the land of few property holdouts-would
not be controversial, "except as to that portion of the land which is now
73
owned by private persons, those persons being only two in number."
Senator Howard seemed to suggest that the number of affected
property owners, which was only a few, justified the taking. But more
importantly, he went on to explain that the power to take was implied
under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. Senator Johnson agreed,
arguing that regardless of the Takings Clause, the federal power to take
was an incident of sovereignty. 74 Ultimately, President Abraham Lincoln
signed the bill, which became the first instance of federal authorization
75
to directly condemn private land within state lines for a federal project.
It is unclear whether the private land at issue was ever actually
condemned, but the record suggests that it was not, and instead was
purchased. 76
Congress later debated the federal eminent domain power in the
states for purposes of constructing railroads. Even there, Senator
Howard argued that the federal government could condemn land within
a state to construct a railroad.7 7 While the takings power to construct an
arsenal in Illinois was authorized, the power to condemn for purposes of
a railroad inside states lines ultimately failed. 78Congress defeated such
amendments and squashed any further discussion.79 Later railroad bills
70.
71.
81.
72.
73.
74.
75.
CONG.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Act of July 11, 1862, ch. 148, 12 Stat. 537; Baude, supra note 13, at 1780-81.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1477-78 (1864); Baude, supra note 13, at 1780CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1478; Baude, supra note 13, at 1781.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1478; Baude, supra note 13, at 1781.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1478; Baude, supra note 13, at 1782.
Baude, supra note 13, at 1782; see also Act of Apr. 19, 1864, ch. 60, 13 Stat. 50;
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1802.
Baude, supra note 13, at 1782-83, 1783 n.266.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2379; Baude, supra note 13, at 1783.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2379-84; Baude, supra note 13, at 1783.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2379-80; Baude, supra note 13, at 1783.
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followed the traditional custom of consent and cooperation by state
legislatures before the federal government could take land for the
railroad.80 Several other instances of legislative authorization of federal
takings occurred, mostly for the construction of national cemeteries 8 1 and
a federal railroad from Missouri to the Pacific. 82 Another bill authorized
federal takings power for a construction project along rapids on the
Mississippi River, but only under existing state condemnation law.8 3
Nonetheless, as William Baude's research shows, it took seventy-five
years until the first federal takings authorization by Congress in the
1864 Rock Island legislation.8 4 Even after some sporadic railroad
episodes of federal takings authorizations, Congress still preferred to
practice the traditional cooperative federalism system.85 While political
considerations largely affected the founding sentiments about federal
eminent domain, it took state and federal courts years to finally succumb
to a doctrine that espoused an inherent sovereign power of the federal
government to condemn land within state boundaries.
B. DoctrinalDevelopments
In the early to mid 1800s, several state courts ruled on the question
of federal eminent domain. In Dickey v. Maysville, Washington,
Paris & Lexington Turnpike Road Co., the Kentucky Court of Appeals
stated that Congress was required to obtain consent from the state
legislature of Kentucky before using a state road as a post road "[u]nless
Congress shall elect to exert its right of eminent domain."8 6 These
sentiments, of course, had no bearing on the federal courts. In the late
1800s, the Supreme Court affirmed the position that Congress did not
have the power to exercise eminent domain directly. In Pollardv. Hagan,
the Supreme Court said it was "necessary to enter into a more minute
examination of the rights of eminent domain, and the right to the public
lands."8 7
The issue concerned ownership of a riverfront plot of land in
Alabama. The land had been granted by Congress after Alabama's
admission into the Union. The Court explained that by entrance into the
Union, Alabama enjoyed equal footing with the original states, and that
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Baude, supra note 13, at 1774-75.
Act of Feb. 22, 1867, ch. 61, § 5, 14 Stat. 399; Baude, supra note 13, at 1784.
Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 278, 14 Stat. 292; Baude, supra note 13, at 1784.
Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 184, 15 Stat. 124; Baude, supra note 13, at 1785.
Baude, supra note 13, at 1761.
Id. at 1785.
37 Ky. (7 Dana) 113, 113 (1838).
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222 (1845).
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8
included all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain.
The Court, notably, stated that "the United States have no constitutional
capacity to exercise ... eminent domain, within the limits of a state ...
except in the cases in which it is expressly granted [by the
Constitution]."89 The Court further explained that the Constitution did
not expressly grant eminent domain powers to the federal government
90
and that such a power was not authorized under the text by implication.
Then, in Goodtitle v. Kibbe, the Court reaffirmed its position, and the one
Congress seemingly held, that the federal government had no entrenched
91
granted power to condemn land. The Court there stated that the federal
government could not "grant or confirm a title to land when the
92
sovereignty and dominion over it had become vested in the State."
Yet as the political landscape began to shift decades after Pollardand
Kibbe, so did the sentiment of state and federal courts. In Avery v. Fox, a
federal court in Michigan concluded that "[i]t is an incident to the
sovereignty of the United States, and a right recognized in the
93
constitution ... that it may take private property for public use." A
Georgia federal district court likewise noted "the paramount right of
94
eminent domain" was "an attribute of sovereignty in the nation." And
state courts in Kentucky and Michigan gave credence to a federal
eminent domain doctrine.9 5 Although in New Hampshire, the state
96
supreme court was less certain about the doctrine.
Finally, the Supreme Court in Kohl v. United States altered the
course of history in 1875.97 There, Justice Strong simply implied a federal
eminent domain power, stating that "[t]he Constitution itself contains an
implied recognition of [eminent domain] beyond what may justly be
98
implied from the express grants." In Kohl, a federal statute was at
issue. Congress passed legislation that authorized the Secretary of the
Treasury to purchase land for a federal building in Ohio, but Congress

88. Id. at 216.
89. Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 224.
91. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 471, 478 (1850).
92. Id.
93. 2 F. Cas. 245, 247 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1868) (No. 674).
94. In re Smith, 22 F. Cas. 399, 401 (N.D. Ga. 1873) (No. 12,986), aff'd, 22 F. Cas. 413
(C.C.N.D. Ga. 1876) (No. 12,996).
95. Hughes v. Todd, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 188, 190-92 (1865); People ex rel. Trombley v.
Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 476 (1871).
96. Orr v. Quimby, 54 N.H. 590, 592-93 (1874); id. at 603-06 (Doe, J., dissenting).
97. 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
98. Id. at 372.
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did not grant federal takings authority, instead choosing to rely upon
state procedures.9 9
Later decisions expanded the implied power to condemn, even
invoking the Necessary and Proper Clause in United States v. Gettysburg
Electric Railway Co., noting that "[t]he right to condemn at all is not
[expressly] given. It results from the powers that are given, and it is
implied because of its necessity, or because it is appropriate in exercising
those powers."10 0 But, as Baude notes, for seventy-five years
post-ratification there was never a "purely federal taking" inside state
lines.101 That is, nearly every taking occurred cooperatively between the
state and the federal government, often requiring consent by the state
legislature or requiring the federal government to initiate the suit as a
plaintiff under state condemnation procedures. Even when the Court in
Kohl implied a federal eminent domain power, it noted that at the time
of the ruling, "this power [eminent domain] of the Federal government
has not heretofore been exercised adversely." 102
C.

The Practiceof CooperativeFederalism Post-Ratification

So what did the process of consent and cooperation actually look like
at the founding, and was it necessarily always cooperative? And how
would such a cooperative federalist takings regime work today between
federal agents and state governments? Traditional notions of federalism
tend to fall along ideological lines, with conservatives supporting
federalism and states' rights elements of the dual sovereign, and liberals
tending to support a national government that protects dissenters and
minorities. 103 Although these traditional camps did not always fall along
the same political party, Democrats historically have preferred greater
national power and Republicans state rights and sovereignty. These
traditional notions also tend to define federalism as a dual sovereign
system where states rival and challenge the federal government by
wielding their autonomous authority.104 On the other hand, cooperative
federalism is the idea that in order for the federal government to execute
its policies, it must do so with the support of the states. The federal
government, under this argument, simply does not have the resources to
fully execute its policies, and, therefore, the role of states in a dual
99. Act of Mar. 12, 1872, ch. 45, 17 Stat. 39.
100. 160 U.S. 668, 681 (1896).
101. See Baude, supra note 13, at 1761.
102. 91 U.S. at 372-73.
103. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L.J. 1256, 1258 (2009).
104. See id.
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sovereignty is not primarily of an autonomous nature, but as supportive
105
Scholars who support
servants and allies to the federal government.
06
argue that
the virtues and general workings of cooperative federalism
states are not distinct entities that regulate "[their] own . . . sphere of
authority."10 7 As Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken note,
cooperative federalism scholars view the system as integrative, where
"states should serve not as rivals or challengers to federal authority, but
108
as faithful agents implementing federal programs."
Cooperative federalism is sometimes viewed as coterminous with
109
which embraces the "interaction" instead of the
interactive federalism,
"separation" of state and federal relations of federalism.110 This
"[i]nteractive" vision rejects the creation of "enclaves" that exclude state
and federal power.11 1 While some scholars, such as Robert Schapiro,
envision the state-federal system as an "interactive" one that "accepts a
112
many more
substantial role for dissonance as well as harmony,"
cooperative federalism advocates prefer to view the system as "servant"
to federal mandates and to avoid resistance because it would be
113
Still, Schapiro thinks that stateunproductive in the federalist system.
federal conflicts "present the biggest challenge for interactive
federalism." 114 Thus, "interactive" and "cooperative" federalisms view the
dual sovereign as complimentary, not competitive.
Robert Cover, on the other hand, offers a "desirable alternative"
vision of "[c]ombative federalism," in which "federal programs are
exclusively federal," where the federal government provides funds to
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., id. at 1262 n.14; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalismand Cooptation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983); Harry N. Scheiber, American Federalism and the
Diffusion of Power:Historicaland ContemporaryPerspectives, 9 TOL. L. REV. 619, 641, 64448 (1978); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1695-703 (2001); Philip J. Weiser,
Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663
(2001) [hereinafter Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecture]; Joseph F. Zimmerman,
National-State Relations: Cooperative Federalism in the Twentieth Century, 31 PUBLIUS,
Spring 2001, at 15.
107. Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecture, supra note 106, at 665.
108. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 103, at 1262.
109. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWAL. REV.
243, 248-49 (2005) [hereinafter Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism].
110. Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens's Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2133, 2135 (2006) [hereinafter Schapiro, Justice Stevens's Theory of Interactive
Federalism].
111. Id.
112. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, supranote 109, at 249.
113. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 103, at 1262-63.
114. Schapiro, Justice Stevens's Theory of Interactive Federalism, supra note 110, at
2142.
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states directly, and that any ensuing "combat" by the states provides "an
effective political check on the exercise of national power."115 BulmanPozen and Gerken go further, carving out an independent strand of
federalism that begins to look and sound like Cover's "combative
federalism"-that is, "uncooperative federalism."116 They argue that the
federalism literature does not account for "the ways in which states
playing the role of federal servant can also resist federal mandates, the
ways in which integration-and not just autonomy--can empower states
to challenge federal authority."117 In other words, Bulman-Pozen and
Gerken seem to distinguish "uncooperative federalism" from the other
forms of federalism described above by arguing that states can serve as
rivals and challengers to their federal counterparts "even where they lack
autonomy."118 Indeed, whereas cooperative federalism supporters are
hesitant to endorse the view that the system is adversarial and
combative, Bulman-Pozen and Gerken argue that such contestations and
resistance should be valued.119 In other words, resistance "can and does
take place in the many areas of federalism where states lack
policymaking autonomy."1 20 In theory, states have the power to resist or
contest federal policies.1 21 Whether they wield that power is a different
question.
While it may seem that cooperative federalism is "inconsistent with
the spirit of the Constitution," the historical practices of consent and
cooperation in land acquisition beg to differ. 122 Indeed, the "early pattern
of takings for federal projects" points towards a well-oiled cooperative
federalist (or interactive federalist) regime.1 23 A case at the California
Supreme Court, Gilmer v. Lime Point, is instructive for understanding
how consent and cooperation worked in the early practices of cooperative
land acquisition. 124

115. Federalism and Administrative Structure, supra note 4, at 1343 (arguing that
cooperative federalism undermines "the only viable restraint on the congressional exercise
of enumerated powers: the political process").
116. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 103, at 1262-63.
117. Id. at 1263.
118. Id. at 1263-64.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1264.
121. Id. at 1271.
122. See Baude, supra note 13, at 1815.
123. Id. at 1823.
124. 18 Cal. 229 (1861). For context, it is worth noting that, at an elementary level, a
"fort" is defined as a "strong or fortified place" or "permanent army post" ordinarily reserved
for national security and military purposes. Fort, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fort (last updated Apr. 13, 2018). Indeed, a "wall"the kind proposed by the Trump Administration-is defined as a "contiguous, physical wall
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Recall that consent and cooperation was the norm for land
acquisitions by the federal government for federal projects from the
founding to the late 1800s. 125 Several years prior to Gilmer reaching the
Supreme Court of California, the California state legislature enacted a
statute that permitted the state to relinquish property located within the
state to the federal government for "sites of light-houses and for other
purposes, on the coasts and waters" and allowing the federal government
to proceed in state court as a plaintiff to condemn land within the state
126
for, among other things, a fort or other military or naval purposes.
Gilmer raised the issue of whether the federal government could acquire
land within California for purposes of constructing a fort without the aid
127
or sanction of the state legislature.
The plaintiff, Jeremy Gilmer, Captain of Engineers in the Army of
the United States of America, was considered an agent of the federal
government. 128 The conflict arose when Gilmer sought to purchase land
from Samuel Throckmorton, a landowner in San Francisco, in order to
build the fort. 129 However, a disagreement ensued over the price of the
130
But since
land, which apparently could not be resolved amicably.
Throckmorton's land was "necessary and indispensable" to construct the
131
The
fort, Gilmer relied upon the California statute to acquire the land.
federal government sought to have the value and damages of the land
determined and have the courts of California, pursuant to the statute,
award the land and enter title in the United States. 132
Throckmorton contended the federal government refused to pay his
offer of $200,000 for his land. 133 He further argued that the California
statute, which effectively authorized the federal government to proceed
13 4
The gist of his
in state court as a plaintiff, was unconstitutional.
contentions was that Gilmer presented himself not only as the agent of
the federal government, but also as the "instrument or agent of the
commonwealth of California in her exercise of' the power of eminent
domain. 135 Throckmorton was concerned over the appropriateness of a
or other similarly secure, contiguous, and impassable physical barrier." Exec. Order No.
13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8794 (Jan. 25, 2017).
125. See supra Section II.A.
126. Gilmer, 18 Cal. at 229.
127. Id. at 230.
128. Id. at 230-31.
129. Id. at 231.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 232.
133. Id. at 231.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 239.
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federal agent seemingly acting as an agent of the state. The concern for
Throckmorton had to do with ex post considerations; that is, after the
property is condemned pursuant to the California statute and
transferred to the federal government, "no power could compel her [i.e.,
the federal government,] to use it for a fort." 136 Indeed, the prospect of
such a result was, according to Throckmorton, opposite of the traditional
understanding of taking private property, because "[t]he people of the
State of California do not propose to keep the property for one instant of
time" but instead "propose to bestow it upon another" by immediately
casting the property from the owner and then losing control of the
property immediately by transferring it over to the federal
government.137
In an attempt to reconcile these competing understandings of the
nature of eminent domain, Throckmorton explained that California is
"the source of all title, and gives to the property a State origin. 138 But, he
continued, "[t]he people of the State propose now to resume it, and
incorporate it with the mass of their other possessions," not for the public
use, but in order to transfer the property to the federal government. 139
Thus, Throckmorton concluded that the federal government cannot be
instruments of the state legislature "in exercising eminent domain." 140
Throckmorton essentially argued that it would be improper, if not
"preposterous," for the state of California to condemn land owned by the
federal government to use by the state. 141 And, it would equally be
preposterous for the federal government to condemn land within
California. The California state legislature, in other words, was
"powerless" to condemn private property and transfer it to the federal
government as a plaintiff in state court, because doing so essentially
permits the government to remove the hat of "governmental panoply" and
become an individual or artificial person. 142
Gilmer, on the other hand, argued that "the property ... acquired ...
would be held by the Government as a proprietor, but it would be
appropriated for national purposes alone, in which the people of the State
would have the use by the protection afforded."143 The government went
further, in discussing the purposes and reasons for a federal fort, noting

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
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that "[a] public exigency need not be one which affects all equally .

. .

. It

144
is enough, for many purposes, that there be merely a local exigency."
The Supreme Court of California upheld this form of cooperative
federalism for land acquisition. The court explained that national
security allows for California, "having a public interest in this defense,"
to condemn private property and transfer it to the federal government as
part of a cooperative scheme to secure the means of defense. 145 Indeed,
the court was not shy about the reality of foreign affairs, and that the
federal government, having the means of war and defense, was entrusted
to defend the nation against foreign invasion and provide national
security.14 6 But the court also acknowledged that nothing in the
Constitution said anything regarding the power to condemn land within
the state for federal forts. 147 Indeed, California, the court said, may
choose the federal government as the agent to accomplish the goal of
constructing a fort for national security purposes, and that such a taking
148
Essentially, the
is clearly a public use for the citizens of California.
court found that there is no rule or principle under the state or federal
constitutions that prohibits the federal government from filing a
condemnation action in California to obtain the land necessary for a
fort. 149 As the court concluded, "[i]t may be considered a sufficient
guarantee that the Federal Government will use the property in the right
way, that such is the implied obligation of the Government, or that its
150
interest or its duty will so direct."
A slightly different cooperative federalism was practiced in Michigan.
The Michigan state legislature authorized the Governor's power to
exercise eminent domain within the state and then turn the land over to
15 1
The Governor would be
the United States to erect a lighthouse.
contacted by federal agents who would request the land situated within
152
The
the state as necessary for the construction of a lighthouse.
Governor would then appoint three commissioners to condemn the land

&

144. Id. (quoting J.B. Thayer, The Right of Eminent Domain, 19 MONTHLY L. REP. 241,
254 (1856)). Interestingly, the court cited Dickey v. Maysville, Washington, Paris
Lexington Turnpike Road Co., which stood for the proposition at the time that "[u]nless
Congress shall elect to exert its right of eminent domain, and buy a State road, or make one
or help to make or repair it, the constitution gives no authority to use it as a post road,
without the consent of the State." 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 113, 113 (1838).
145. Gilmer, 18 Cal. at 257.
146. Id. at 255-56.
147. Id. at 256.
148. See id. at 256-60.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 260.
151. People ex rel. Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471, 472 (1871).
152. See id. at 472-73.
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by appraising the value and determining just compensation. 153 Once the
commissioners completed the taking of title, the Governor would then
convey the land to the federal government. The federal government's
justification for such a cooperative practice was to regulate, control, and
protect commerce along navigable waters.154 However, the statute was
found unconstitutional on the grounds that the state inherently may not
authorize the taking of private property within the state border only for
the governor to convey it over for use exclusively by the federal
government. 155 The judicial decision was an outlier, as there are few
cases that purport to find state cooperation in federal land acquisition
inconsistent with the Constitution. 156
In Connecticut, another form of cooperative federalism was practiced.
There, a local municipality, as opposed to solely the state legislature, was
permitted to condemn private property for the exclusive purpose of
conveying the property to the federal government for naval purposes. 157
In April, 1868, New London exercised this power, taking private land and
conveying it over to the Secretary of Navy. 158 In Rhode Island, the state
legislature enacted a law specifically for the fortification of Newport,
which, similar to Michigan, permitted the governor to force the transfer
of land to the state to then convey to the federal government. 159 Indeed,
in New York, the state legislature authorized the state to commence
condemnation proceedings on behalf of the federal government to acquire
lands, which would benefit the citizens of the state.16 0 There, the statute
authorized the federal government to file a claim as a petitioner in New
York courts. 16 1 In other words, the state accepted "aid offered by the
United States in carrying on a public work in which both are
interested." 162 As Baude remarks, examples of consent and cooperation
"suggest that the constitutional design anticipated state involvement in
federal land acquisitions and building projects."SS Central to many of
these state-led efforts to seize land and convey to the federal government
was national security.

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 472-73, 483.
See Darlington v. United States, 82 Pa. 382, 386-87 (1876).
Branch v. Lewerenz, 53 A. 658, 659 (Conn. 1902).
Id.
See Baude, supranote 13, at 1762.
In re United States, 96 N.Y. 227, 227 (1884).
Id.
Id.
See Baude, supra note 13, at 1760.

668

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:647

So, what is one to make of this history of federal-state cooperation in
light of today's polemic debate over national immigration policy and the
proposed international border wall between the United States and
Mexico?
III. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER WALL

Today, effectively any authorized officer of the federal government
may exercise a federal taking by initiating condemnation proceedings in
federal court. 164 At one time nearly eight thousand federal takings
occurred each year.1 65 In fact, the federal government has already
166
Indeed, the power, largely authorized
acquired "plenty" of land.
through the General Condemnation Act and the Declaration of Taking
Act, has given the federal government carte blanche to condemn land for,
among other things, civil, military, and national security projects,
including an international border wall, with little resistance from
167
The specter of such a "great
landowners, state, or local governments.
power[]" is relevant to today's debate over land acquisition for the Trump
68
The debate has culminated in a
Administration's border wall.1
legislative measure by Democrats in the House to restrict the federal
power. This political response to the border wall Executive Order offers
an opportunity to tie the historical practices and sentiments of federal
land acquisition to a major contemporary debate over federal takings
power.
Like the Senate and House representatives who debated land
acquisitions for forts and arsenals at the founding, some elected officials
representing districts along the U.S.-Mexico border today oppose the
construction of the wall. Rep. Ruben Gallego of Arizona, stated that "it's
already abundantly clear that Mexico won't pay for Trump's . . . border

164. See 40 U.S.C. § 3113 (2012) ("An officer of the Federal Government authorized to
acquire real estate for the erection of a public building or for other public uses may acquire
the real estate for the Government by condemnation, under judicial process, when the
officer believes that it is necessary or advantageous to the Government to do so.").
165. See Baude, supra note 13, at 1743 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CED-8054, FEDERAL LAND ACQUISITIONS BY CONDEMNATION: OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE DELAYS

AND COSTS 2 (1980)).
166. Id. at 1744.
167. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 165, at i; see also 40 U.S.C. §§ 311415 (2012) (authorizing federal quick-take procedure permitting federal agency or officer to
obtain possession of land after depositing compensation value with the court); United
States v. 1.04 Acres of Land, 538 F. Supp. 2d 995, 999, 1001-03 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
168. See Baude, supra note 13, at 1738.
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wall." 169 Rep. Raiil Grijalva of Arizona noted that the wall would create
"arbitrary borders or barriers between nations" and that a border wall
cannot "fix our immigration system."1 70 Rep. Henry Cuellar of Texas,
sensitive to the property rights issues in his district, stated "we take the
concept of private property very seriously .

...

Texans stand up for

ourselves when the federal government tries to take what is ours." 17' As
for the construction of a physical wall, Rep. Juan Vargas of California
noted that "[t]he Trump Administration should be spending their energy
on carrying out policy ideas that benefit the American people rather than
wasting their time and resources on the prototypes for the wall." 172 These
sentiments have become a rallying cry for ten Democratic members of the
House to halt the construction of a wall by targeting the federal eminent
domain power.
On October 4, 2017, Reps. Gallego, Grijalva, Cuellar, and Vargas,
along with six other House members, co-sponsored the "Protecting the
Property Rights of Border Landowners Act." The bill amends the INA by
prohibiting the Attorney General and the Secretary of DHS from
wielding the federal takings power to acquire private land along the
border to build an international border wall.1 73 The sponsors of the bill
represent districts near the U.S.-Mexico border, including districts in
Texas, New Mexico, California, and Arizona (with the exception of the
sponsor representing New York). These Democrats-who presumably
more often than not support national power over a state-led federalist
regime-may be unaware that the bill harkens back to the spirit and
practice of the early republic during the founding generation. Like
Congress in the mid 1800s, which at times had difficulty agreeing on a
number of funding and land acquisition matters concerning forts on Pea
Patch Island in Delaware and arsenals on Rock Island in Illinois, today's

169.

David Choi, Democratic Lawmaker Unleasheson Trump's US-Mexico Border Wall,

Bus. INSIDER (July 12, 2017, 10:29 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-borderwall-ruben-gallego-us-mexico-2017-7.
170. Ratil Grijalva, Raul Grijalva: Trump's Border Wall Would Harm Americans, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR (July 23, 2016), http://tueson.com/raul-grijalva-trump-s-border-wall-wouldharm-americans/article f4157ee4-344f-5972-8fda-c2abc53821ee. html.
171. Ron Nixon, Trump's Wall Faces a Barrier in Texas: Landowner Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES (May 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/07/us/politics/trump-wall-facesbarrier-in-texas.html.
172. Phillip Molnar, Trump Border Walls Will Be Built in San Diego with or Without
Budget Funds, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 26, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://
www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/economy/sd-fi-border-wall-still-getting-built20170426-story.html.
173. H.R. 3943, 115th Cong. (2017).
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Congress is equally stymied to agree on border wall funding and land
acquisition. 174
This bill is arguably one of the most recent and sweeping attempts to
rein in federal eminent domain for one of the nation's largest land
75
But, the history and practice of
acquisition projects in decades.
cooperative federalism suggests that expressly prohibiting the federal
eminent domain power does not completely close the door to the DHS and
the Attorney General acquiring the land for the wall. Indeed, while the
bill may block a purely federal path to taking the land, Congress could
still arguably achieve the same land acquisition objective indirectly by
relying upon cooperative federalism with state legislatures or local
governments in California, New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas along the
border by choosing to enter the state courts to achieve the same end or
requesting the states to seize land and convey it over to the federal

government.

176

One might argue that the Protecting the Property Rights of Border
Landowners Act attempts, implicitly, to force the Trump Administration
to rely upon and cooperate with state legislatures and local
municipalities in order to acquire the land to build the wall. The Attorney
General and the Secretary of DHS could file an action in state court as a
plaintiff seeking to strip title from landowners along the Texas border to
build the wall. Further, there does not seem to be any immediate hurdles
to the Trump Administration requesting a state legislature or a local
municipality to seize the land and convey it over to the DHS for purposes
of construction. On the other hand, states along the border are unlikely
to successfully place conditions on or restrict the Attorney General or
Secretary of DHS from proceeding in state court to condemn land along
the border.1 77 There is precedent where some states have codified

174. Burset, supra note 64, at 194.
175. See Gerald S. Dickinson, Forget Funding the Wall, Trump Needs the Land First,
2017, 8:20 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/theTHE HILL (Aug. 25,
administration/347912-forget-funding-the-wall-trump-needs-the-land-first.
176. In re United States, 96 N.Y. 227, 223-24 (1884) ("While the Federal Government,
as an independent sovereignty, has the power of condemning land within the States for its
own public use, we see no reason to doubt that it may lay aside its sovereignty, and, as a
petitioner, enter the State courts and there accomplish the same end through proceedings
authorized by the State legislature." (citations omitted)).
177. See City of Pleasant Ridge v. Romney, 169 N.W.2d 625, 634 (Mich. 1969) ("[The
Federal power of eminent domain is complete and cannot, absent some specific statutory
limitation in the Federal act itself, be conditioned by any State or local or private rights.");
see also id. ("If the United States have the power, it must be complete in itself. It can neither
be enlarged nor diminished by a State. Nor can any State prescribe the manner in which it
must be exercised. The consent of a State can never be a condition precedent to its
enjoyment." (quoting Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 374 (1875)).
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procedures to permit state and local governments to request the federal
government to condemn land in federal court that the state agency, under
state law, is prohibited from condemning.1 78 These are just a few
contemporary examples of cooperative federalism in takings. However, a
federal law prohibiting the DHS and Attorney General from pure
exercises of eminent domain in federal court does raise the likelihood that
"quick take" proceedings, often times used by former DHS Secretary
Michael Chertoff to construct fencing along the border, would be reduced
by forcing the federal government to file takings actions in state courts
where it would have less discretion to invoke the speedy dispossession
mechanism. 179
Indeed, it is conceivable that Congress or agents of the federal
government could request legislatures of states along the border to
condemn land and convey it over to DHS, Border Patrol, or the Army
Corps of Engineers to begin construction as part of a renewed cooperative
federalist system as a result of the bill. In California, prior laws have
authorized the board of supervisors of certain counties to take and convey
real property to the federal government. 180 In Texas, the legislature has
authorized such practices, permitting the seizure of privately-owned land
within Texas to be conveyed to, and used by, the federal government so
long as the legislature has deemed the use a "public use."181 There is also
precedent for a municipality authorizing its city solicitor to condemn
private property to be used for a post office. 1 82
The United States and Mexico, through state relations with Texas,
have also acquired lands for projects related to infrastructure under
Texas state law. In Richardson v. Cameron County,183 a Texas appeals
court was faced with the question of whether the state legislature could
delegate the power of eminent domain to a county for the purpose of

178. See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 209 F. Supp. 483 (S.D. Ill. 1962).
179. See 40 U.S.C. § 3114 (2012); Commercial Station Post Office v. United States, 48
F.2d 183, 184-86 (8th Cir. 1931) (granting immediate possession to federal government
after taking proceedings initiated, but before just compensation determined); United States
v. 1.04 Acres of Land, 538 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1007 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that provisions of
Declaration of Taking Act permit expedited procedure of taking title and possession of lands
to enable DHS to begin construction of fencing before final judgment is available when the
federal officer is authorized to bring condemnation action in federal court). Quick-take
statutes vary amongst the states.
180. San Benito County v. Copper Mountain Mining Co. of Cal., 45 P.2d 428, 429 (1935)
(per curiam) (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1238 (repealed 1975)).
181. Tex. Fruit Palace, Inc. v. City of Palestine, 842 S.W.2d 319, 322 (1992) (finding a
Texas statute permitting municipal or county governments to acquire land for use by
federal government valid); see also TEX. LOc. GOVT CODE ANN.. § 280.001 (West 2005).
182. Tex. Fruit Palace, Inc., 842 S.W.2d at 321.
183. 275 S.W.2d 709 (1955) (per curiam).
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conveying private land to the federal government to use for construction
184
There, the court
of a flood control system owned by the government.
upheld the statute as permissible, noting that the Texas legislature could
lawfully authorize a county to condemn land and transfer it to the federal
government. 185 Indeed, it is conceivable that the likes of Cameron County
or the municipality of Brownsville, where past eminent domain battles
over fencing have occurred,1 86 could elect to condemn private property
and convey it over to the federal government for the wall. But given the
contentious history of land acquisition along those areas of the Texas
border, 187 it could also easily devolve into the kind of combative or
uncooperative federalism that Gerken and Cover speak to. Local and
state entities along the border could potentially refuse to condemn
private land on behalf of the federal government, but as noted, state
statutes already permit the federal government to avoid that obstacle by
filing petitions in state court seeking to acquire the land through the
state condemnation procedures. While some courts have foreclosed states
from requiring state consent as a condition precedent to federal exercises
of eminent domain, statutory limitations under federal law-perhaps
like the one proposed by House Democrats-could potentially permit
state and local governments to place some restrictions or conditions on
federal agencies' attempts to condemn land within state borders. 188
The House Democrats' bill would not be the first time in
contemporary history that Congress tried to restrict the federal eminent
domain power to some degree, but there are key differences in the
proposals. Shortly after the infamous Kelo v. City of New London
ruling,18 9 the House introduced the Private Property Rights Protection
Act of 2005.190 This federal effort would have prohibited state and local
governments from exercising eminent domain for economic development

184. Id. at 710; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7880-147v, § 1 (1936) (current version
at TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 561.005 (West 2009)); see also Vann v. Cameron County,
124 S.W.2d 167, 172 (1939) (upholding statute authorizing county taking of private
property for flood control purposes).
185. Richardson, 275 S.W.2d at 712.
186. United States v. 1.04 Acres of Land, 538 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1003 (S.D. Tex. 2008)
("Congress made the construction of the fence between Laredo and Brownsville, Texas a
priority .... ).
187. Id. at 1013 (discussing consultation requirements between federal government and
state and local governments prior to condemning land).
188. City of Pleasant Ridge v. Romney, 169 N.W.2d 625, 634 (Mich. 1969) ("[T]he Federal
power of eminent domain is complete and cannot, absent some specific statutory limitation
in the Federal act itself, be conditioned by any State or local or private rights.").
189. 545 U.S. 469, 484-85 (2005) (upholding economic development takings as justifiable
public use).
190. H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).
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purposes if the state or local government received federal economic
development funds. 191 The bill languished in the House and never made
it to the Senate. In March 2017, Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, Rep. Maxine
Waters, and Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick revived the issue of constraining, in
part, the federal eminent domain power by introducing the Private
Property Rights Protection Act of 2017, which proposed to prohibit the
federal government from exercising its condemnation powers for
economic development purposes. 192
Much like prior state reform efforts, the bill would have directly
restricted the federal government, as opposed to the state and local
governments, from taking private property of economic development
purposes. 193 The bill was also partly motivated by concerns over eminent
domain abuse in rural areas, where land, such as farmland and ranches,
is subject to takings that may impact existing irrigation and reclamation
projects. 194 These federal bills, nonetheless, do not implicate the border
wall, as one would be hard-pressed to argue that the Executive Order is
being pursued for an economic development purpose. 195 Indeed, the major
difference with Congress's prior effort to restrict condemnation powers is
that the focus was mostly on constraining federal funding to local and
state governments that exercised eminent domain for economic
development purposes or reining in economic development takings
specifically. But as many know, federal takings involve a wide range of
uses, such as civil-military, natural resource, environmental,
recreational, and national parks.
CONCLUSION

The Executive Order has offered a timely and instructive opportunity
to explore the elusive federal power of eminent domain. This Essay shows
that the recent controversy over the border wall adds a property law
dimension to ongoing cooperative federalism debates regarding federal
immigration policy. The Democrats' bill embraces the spirit of the
founding generation by implicitly invoking the potential of the federal
government partaking in a cooperative system of land acquisition with
states along the border as an alternative means to achieve the Trump
Administration's policy goal. If the bill blocks a purely federal path to

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
border

§ 2(a).
H.R. 1689, 115th Cong. §§ 1-2(a) (2017).
Id. § 2(a).
Id.
Note however that economic incentives may be accrued from the construction of the
wall as contractors, builders, and developers vie for contracts to build it.
Id.
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taking the land, then it implies that Congress could still achieve that
same objective indirectly by proceeding through to state law to seize the
land. This was, of course, the very nature of the process of acquiring land
for federal projects post-ratification. The prospect of a Republicancontrolled Congress seeking consent and cooperation from the state
legislatures in Arizona, Texas, or New Mexico to seize land along the
border may, alternatively, give rise to the kind of "uncooperative
196
federalism" experienced in the travel ban and sanctuary city sagas.
Indeed, Republicans opposing the construction of a wall may seize
the chance to recapture the spirit of the early republic and founding
generation against federal takings of land within state boundaries,
particularly "as many Republicans subscribe to originalism as a
constitutional philosophy." 197 Likewise, Democrats may find solace in
this historical account as a basis for resistance against the wall, as it
offers the left a "progressive" path to halting the construction of the wall
by, oddly enough, relying upon an old federalist land acquisition regime
of consent and cooperation. 198 The House Democrats' bill, nonetheless, is
the aide-m6moire that helps place land seizures as part of President
Trump's border wall Executive Order into historical context.

196. Id.
197. Gerald S. Dickinson, The Founders Would Have Opposed Seizing Land for Trump's
POST
Border Wall: The History of Eminent Domain Is Not on the White House's Side, WASH.
7
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/201 /11/29/thefounders-would-have-opposed-seizing-land-for-trumps-border-wall/?utm term=.dddb67a8
cce4.
198. Id.

